INTRODUCTION
Imagine a website used by hundreds of millions of people worldwide. The site offers-free of charge-a new, innovative social networking service that people compulsively check several times a day. Now imagine that, in order to entice such a large following, the website hid or misstated the nature of the service offered. For instance, imagine that its advertisements claimed that it would never sell user data to advertisers-but, later realizing the fmancial potential there, the service began to do so, and reaped large mentators have noted, when users don't pay for a product, often the user is the product.
6 That is, companies like Google and Facebook develop a large user base by offering free services and then "sell against" that user base to advertisers, venture capitalists, and other financial backers.
7
The central focus of this Article is the interplay between traditional commercial speech analysis, which focuses on whether a fee is exchanged for goods or services, and the rise of new non-linear commercial transactions. Current commercial speech doctrine takes a relatively limited view as to what constitutes a commercial transaction. 8 Though providing an only slightly more expansive understanding on occasion, 9 the Court has identified commercial speech as that speech that "does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction. "' 10 This vision of what constitutes commercial 5. See, e.g., FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (stating, "It's free and always will be"); Twitter Terms of Service, TWITIER, https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (indicating that upon sign up, the terms of use are meant to be the "entire and exclusive agreement between Twitter" and the user and contain no financial charges to the user).
6. Indeed, Google's F AQ for investors answers the question " [ w ] ho are our customers?" as follows: "Our customers are over one million of advertisers, from small businesses targeting local customers to many of the world's largest global enterprises, who use Google AdWords to reach millions of users around the world." Investor Relations, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/corporate/faq.html#toc-customers (last visited Apr. 376, 385 (1973) ). In the more recent United States v. United Foods, Inc., the Court necessary information, 16 and the interests in making sure that corporate players (even those offering free services) are on a level playing field with their competitors make defining the scope of the commercial speech doctrine a critical task. 17 If only speech that proposes a direct fee-for-service transaction between a product's creator and the product's user is considered commercial speech, much of the current regulation of companies like Google and Facebook would be subject to the more stringent limitations of non-commercial speech regulation. 18 The ramifications of such an outcome are troubling.
19
Over the past several years, there has been a rising tide of unease regarding the potential use (or misuse) of user information by Face book, Google, and other free service Internet companies.
2° Consumers, legal scholars, and privacy advocates have demanded more restrictive policies on the use of such information 21 and more stringent government regulation of breaches of privacy policies.
22 Underlying these calls for action is an as- 763-64 (1976) . In establishing the commercial speech doctrine, the main concern of the Court was not simply, nor even primarily, for the speaker proposing the commercial transaction. See id. Rather, the Court was clearly stressing the interest of both the particular consumer and society as a whole in the free flow of commercial information. See id. sumption that the government can require companies that provide free services to publish privacy policies-and that the government can punish companies for breaching their stated policies.
See James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment
Let us imagine, for example, that Facebook were to publish to its users a policy with regards to its use of private user information. 23 Furthermore, imagine that Facebook's website promoted its strict privacy policy on the sign up page for new users. 24 Should local, state, or federal regulators be able to enforce this policy? Should they even be able to compel that such a policy be posted or formulated? Thus far, not only commentators but also regulators 25 -and even, to an extent, Facebook itself2 6 - have answered this question in the affirmative.
Likewise, imagine that Google aggressively promoted its Google+ product through television advertisements that contained false and misleading statements about the capabilities of Google+. Would such advertisements be subject to regulation by state or local prohibitions on false and misleading advertising? Although one's instinct might be to answer in the affirmative, because consumers pay nothing for the Google+ service, 27 current First Amendment doctrine might suggest that the less stringent standards applicable to the regulation of commercial speech would not be a good fit.
Given that both the regulators and, to an extent, the regulated companies believe that their speech directed at non-paying users is able to be regulated without meeting the exacting First Amendment standards afforded to non-commercial speech, perhaps the error is not that the assumption is wrong, but rather that the current contours of the commercial speech doctrine have become outdated. This Article addresses the tension between the current commercial speech test and the rise of business models in which companies do not charge users directly for their products, and proposes two alternate commercial speech tests as solutions to this problem. In Part I, the Article discusses the current test for commercial speech and its implied reliance on a direct economic transaction between the consumer and the speaker/company. In Part II, the Article examines the rise of business models that do not rely on a fee-for-service transaction and the complexities of applying the current commercial speech test to those businesses. In Part III, the Article explores two alternate commercial speech tests--one from the consumer perspective28 and the other from the business perspective 29 -that will allow the doctrine to adjust to the advent of new business models. Although the consumer-oriented model of determining whether speech is commercial may perhaps solve the "problem" of new business models, a business-focused test that examines whether an entity was "selling against" its users in determining whether speech is commercial has not to date been proposed. We propose a fresh definition of "commercial transaction" that takes into account the Internet economy and other indirect financial exchanges. By including transactions where a company leverages consumer participation as a saleable good, the commercial speech doctrine can remain effective and vital in today's digital age.
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2010)
,
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE CONSUMER
A. The Development of the Commercial Speech Doctrine Like the Internet, 30 the commercial speech test is a creature of relatively recent pedigree. Though the Supreme Court has addressed this doctrine relatively frequently over the past few decades, it seems clear from the Court's body of commercial speech jurisprudence that its concept of what constitutes a commercial transaction is based on an overly simple-and perhaps outdated-notion of commerce. Just as some have noted the Court's slowness to adapt constitutional doctrine to new technology in the 29. See Greeley, supra note 6 (explaining that when individuals use free online services, they are supplying the providers with information that is then sold "to the companies of the Digital Advertising Alliance," the actual customers).
30. Although there is some controversy about when the Internet was created, the term "Internet" may have first been used in 1974 Bolger is otherwise a rather unremarkable commercial speech case. Though not uniformly thought of in this way, Bolger should perhaps be considered most notable not for its recitation of the "'no more than propose'" definition, but for its determination that speech that speech not directly proposing a commercial transaction should be analyzed under the commercial speech doctrine. 39 It is conceivable that little attention was paid to this distinction because the statute in question was found unconstitutional even under the less exacting commercial speech standard. 40 It is worthwhile to note, however, that at some point in the development of the commercial speech doctrine, the Court was willing to assess speech that did not directly propose a commercial transaction under the commercial speech test based on the surrounding circumstances. 41 The Court identified three characteristics applicable to determining that these informational pamphlets constituted commercial speech, noting that it was "[t]he combination" of the characteristics that supported the conclusion.
42 These were (l) the concession that the pamphlets were advertisements; (2) the reference to a specific product; and (3) that there was an economic motivation in mailing the pamphlets. 43 The Court noted that none of these reasons would alone be sufficient to turn the mailings into commercial speech, but that taken together they "provide [d] 46 In examining a ban on advertising by a utility company, the Court outlined the parameters for testing the validity of regulations on commercial speech. 47 Central Hudson spawned a four-part test that now bears its name in commercial speech litigation and case law: (1) the speech must be "protected by the First Amendment," that is, "it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading"; and (2) the court will assess "whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial."
48
Upon answering both of these questions in the affirmative, the court looks to (3) "whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted," and ( 4) "whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." 49 In establishing this test, the Court remained conscious that one of the important interests underlying the protection of commercial speech at all is to " (2012) (indicating the decision "rejects the notion that false speech should be in a general category that is presumptively unprotected"); see also id. at 2542, 2547-48 (holding that a statute criminalizing false speech related to claims of military service "would endorse government authority to compile a list of subjects about which false statements are punishable. That governmental power has no clear limiting principle .... Were this law to be sustained, there could be an endless list of subjects the National Government or the States could single out. ... Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech was used to gain a material advantage, it would give government a broad censorial power unprecedented in this Court's cases or in our constitutional tradition. The mere potential for the exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom").
55 especially when juxtaposed against the first prong of the Central Hudson test, underscores the difference between commercial and non-commercial speech, and thus, the importance of capturing the speech in which there is the strongest interest in regulating when constructing the defmition of commercial speech.
The importance of capturing all of the speech that we would want to be regulated as commercial speech was made even more salient by the Court's further clarification of the Central Hudson test. The fourth prong, which demands that the regulation be no "more extensive than is necessary to serve [the asserted government] interest," 58 was sometimes read throughout the ensuing decade as being equivalent to demanding the regulation be the "least restrictive measure." 59 This understanding of the fourth prong would amount to commercial speech having comparable or even greater protection than non-commercial speech in some situations. Realizing this discontinuity, the Court rejected the interpretation of the fourth prong as requiring the regulation be the least restrictive approach. 60 Acknowledging that its own previous dicta assumed the fourth step of Central Hudson was synonymous with "the 'least-restrictive-means' approach," 61 the Court expressly addressed the question and determined that the test "requires something short of a least-restrictive-means standard." 62 Noting that they had not even required this standard in cases "where core political speech is at issue,"63 the Court set the standard at "a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionrnakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be employed."64 Thus, the refinement of the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test creates a real difference between whether protection for commercial or non-commercial speech is applied-and makes identifying the correct threshold markers all the more important. While for a period the posited intermediate scrutiny appeared much more like rational basis review, 65 as the decades have progressed, commercial speech has found substantial protection from the courts. 66 Most notably, the Court's most recent commercial speech case appeared to muddle the accepted understanding of commercial speech and application of the Central Hudson test, thus causing consternation among regulators and academics, and even in half of the Court.
67
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. dealt with a challenge by data miners and pharmaceutical manufacturers against Vermont's Prescription Confidentiality Law, which placed restrictions upon the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that displayed the prescribing practices of physicians within the State. 68 At issue in IMS Health was the pharmaceutical marketing practice known as "detailing," whereby pharmacies, who receive "prescriber-identifying information" when processing prescriptions, sell that information to data-miners, who then produce reports on doctors' prescribing 65. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). In Posadas, the Court upheld a regulation that prohibited advertising by casinos to Puerto Rican residents. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 348. In Edge Broadcasting, building on its decision in Fox, in assessing a ban on lottery advertising by broadcasters in states where the lottery is illegal, the Court "concluded that the validity of restrictions on commercial speech should not be judged by standards more stringent than those applied to expressive conduct entitled to full First Amendment protection or to relevant time, place, or manner restrictions." Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 428-29. Rather, "commercial speech cases require a fit between the restriction and the government interest that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable." /d. This pair of cases perhaps muddled the Central Hudson test more than clarified it. As the dissent in Posadas noted, prior to that case, the Court had "consistently invalidated restrictions designed to deprive consumers of accurate information about products and services legally offered for sale." Posadas, 478 U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting). And in Edge Broadcasting, the regulated radio station at issue actually reached more people in the state where the lottery was legal rather than in its licensing state. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 429. The outcome in Edge Broadcasting left some wondering about the extent of the fit required between the government interest and the restriction. Perhaps Posadas and Edge Broadcasting can be dismissed as only applying in the case of gambling, a long recognized social ill. However, neither case holds up the subject matter as the primary motivation underlying the decision, nor do the cases claim to set out a different test in the gambling context. These cases marked, perhaps, the low point of protection for commercial speech, but the Court returned to greater protections just three years after Edge Broadcasting. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) .
66. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 489 (holding that a ban on price advertising of alcohol was unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
67. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2677 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Thus, it is not surprising that, until today, this Court has never found that the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting the use of information gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate-whether the information rests in government files or has remained in the hands of the private firms that gathered it. ... Nor has this Court ever previously applied any form of 'heightened' scrutiny in any even roughly similar case.").
68. See id. at 2659 (majority opinion).
behavior and sell that information to pharmaceutical manufacturers. 69 The law at issue mandated that this prescriber information "may not be sold, disclosed by pharmacies for marketing purposes, or used for marketing by pharmaceutical manufacturers." 70 The majority and dissenting opinions had entirely different views of the speech in question, and the outcome of the case left many questioning the continued viability of the commercial speech doctrine. 71 The majority held, "Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing[] is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment" and is thus subject to heightened scrutiny. 72 Even though the law in question only regulated information for use in commercial transactions, the Court determined that the state law amounted to both contentbased and speaker-based restrictions. 73 It is clear that from the Court's focus on the content-based nature of the Vermont law that commercial speech analysis was not considered as the appropriate mode of analysis, if considered at all. 74 In what was perhaps most shocking to commentators, the majority opinion contains only one reference to Central Hudson, rather than a clear analysis of the statute in question under the four-prong test. 75 The dissent in IMS Health took an entirely different view of the statute before it. Simply put, for the dissent, the only effect on expression is inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort to regulate a commercial enterprise. The First Amendment does not require courts to apply a special "heightened" standard of review when reviewing such an effort. And, in any event, the statute meets the First Amendment standard this Court has previously applied when the government seeks to regulate commercial speech. constitutes commercial speech. 77 Despite the apparent new "content" analysis of IMS Health, the case underscores the importance of the definitional question of what constitutes commercial speech. 78 The data exchange in question appeared to be wholly commercial-the very stuff of a commercial transaction.
79 For the majority of the Court, however, as their content-based analysis highlights, the statute was not regulating commercial speech, that is, speech that "does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction. "' 80 In addition to having a clear understanding of the legal doctrine that applies to commercial speech, it is important to also keep an eye on the values the Court was aiming to protect when setting up this relatively new doctrine. In establishing that commercial speech was not devoid of protection under the First Amendment, the Court looked to the interest of both the speaker and the listener, determining that a "particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." 81 The Court generalized this interest to be one of society at large and notes that in maintaining "a predominantly free enterprise economy, ... the free flow of commercial information is indispensable." 82 In establishing that commercial speech was not devoid of First Amendment protection, the Court was careful to note that this did not mean that no regulation of commercial speech could stand, rather "[ w ]hat [was] at issue [was] whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity." 83 It is notable that the first foray of commercial speech into the constitutional realm dealt with attempts by the government to prevent consumers from having price information. 84 Rather quickly it became a clash that has turned this set of interests on its head: the government wishes to compel retailers and other commercial speakers to give consumers certain information, and these speakers claim protection from such compulsion-using the doctrine that was initially concerned with ensuring consumers were equipped with the commercial information in which they were likely interested.
An important parallel branch of the commercial speech doctrine came into being in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio. 85 Here, the Court considered regulations on attorney advertising. While striking down several of the prohibitions under the commercial speech doctrine as already discussed, the Court took a different view of the law that required certain disclosures to be made in the advertisements. 86 Noting the "material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech," 87 the Court found a real distinction between a statute that prevented attorneys "from conveying information to the public" and one that "required them to provide somewhat more information than they might otherwise be inclined to present."
88 Identifying a well-informed public as the value underlying any protection for commercial speech, 89 
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.
95 In assessing a regulation that required professional solicitors to disclose the fact that they were paid professionals to potential donors, the State argued that regardless of the protected status of charitable donations in general, the disclosure portion "regulate[ d) only commercial speech because it relate[ d) only to the professional fundraiser's profit from the solicited contribution."
96 Without deciding whether the speech identifying the speaker as a paid professional would alone constitute commercial speech, the Court laid out its "inextricably intertwined" test, thus insulating mixed commercial and non-commercial speech. 97 The Court noted, "we do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech." 98 In Riley, the Court determined that the protected charitable solicitation was entwined with a report on the status of the solicitors to such a degree that the two could not be pulled apart. " [W] here, as here, the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial and impractical. " The definition most often pointed to, as discussed in the previous Section, is that commercial speech is speech that "does 'no more than propose a 95. 487 U.S. 781, 796 n.9 (1988) (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626) ("Purely commercial speech is more susceptible to compelled disclosure requirements.").
96. 101 The courts have also referred to commercial speech as that which "relate [s] solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience. '' 102 As the foregoing discussion of the case law demonstrated, however, the actual practice of defining commercial speech at times reaches a broader category of speech. 103 Moving from the real world application within the case law to the scholarship in this area allows for a focus not only on what actually constitutes commercial speech, but also on what should be included in that category.
From one perspective, the lack of a clear defmition setting the bounds of commercial speech makes the commercial/non-commercial distinction all the more dangerous. One argument insists that, in order to justify this distinction, commercial speech can only constitute the most narrow reading arising from Virginia State Board of Pharmacy: "an offer to sell (X) good or service at (Y) price."
104 Others still have insisted that, while perhaps the commercial speech definition was once broader than the "no more than propose a commercial transaction" definition, doctrinal development at the Court has limited the definition to this original description. 105 Another ar- 107 but goes on to argue that the definition is actually broader.
108
While the "an offer to sell (X) good or service at (Y) price" 109 definition tracks with the most limited defmition of commercial speech and appears to conform to perhaps the bulk of the case law, precedent is only built based on the facts of the cases that appear before a court. Professor Steven Shiffrin has further argued that because most of the commercial speech cases have looked at explicit advertising, the definition espoused by the Court and considered by commentators has missed a great deal of the speech that should be defined as commercial simply because these other types of speech were not before the courts in the genesis of the doctrine. 110
The definition of commercial speech as speech that "relate[ s] solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience" 111 may appear to be only slightly different from the definition as "an offer to sell (X) good or service at (Y) price," 112 but this conclusion also depends on how expansive the category of economic interests is defined. In the aftermath of Nike v. Kasky, scholars considered why corporations were speaking and considered what mattered to a consumer in making their economic choices. In this context, commercial speech could be defined as " [ has considered has involved advertising or the proposal of a commercial transaction, and almost all of the commentators have looked at the 'commercial speech' problem through the lens of commercial advertising. The collective myopia has distorted something quite important: the commercial speech that has been beneath the protection of the first amendment for all these years has not been confined to commercial advertising." (citations omitted)).
111. Cent. their particular subject matter, implicate the economic interests of the speaker. While the economic interests of the audience in this case may be less apparent, it is still plausible that they are indeed implicated. When a consumer makes a choice between products, regardless of the grounds upon which they are making that choice, they implicate economic interests because they are spending money in the economic sphere. That the consumer has chosen to have producers compete on grounds other than product or price does not undermine the fact that the consumer's economic interests are implicated.
114
A variety of scholars have focused on the values underlying the First Amendment in an effort to construct a coherent picture of what exactly is commercial speech. The contours of commercial speech may be sketched out by identifying that speech which does not fulfill the values-namely, self-government and self-expression-that underlie the First Amendment.
115
An examination of the motivations underlying the commercial speech doctrine urges that the "distinction [between core and commercial speech] turns on whether constitutional value attaches to participation in a given speech act, or whether constitutional value attaches instead only to the information conveyed by the speech act."
116 When speech does fulfill a core First Amendment value, then that particular speech perhaps cannot be defined as "commercial." 116. Post, supra note 28, at 20. Post also suggests a method by which to distinguish speech that does not fall within the commercial speech paradigm, not because it is accorded full First Amendment protection, but because it is not considered under the First Amendment: "The doctrine seems to protect only the distribution of commercial information that reinforces a public communicative sphere by addressing strangers who are presumed to be independent and self-possessed. The doctrine stops short of commercial communications between persons deemed to be involved in relationships of dependence or reliance." /d. at 23.
117. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 17, at 1111-33 (concluding that speech at issue in Nike v. Kasky has value in terms of democratic decisionmaking).
Amendment is answered.
118 This line of thought may even be loath to identify a definition of so-called "commercial speech," as it views this as an illegitimate category--one that should not exist and one that should be replaced by more expansive speech protections for the type of speech contemplated by this Section.
119
In addition to the effort to defme the category based upon constitutional values, there is also an effort to focus the defmition of coiilmercial speech based upon consideration of the animating purpose of the doctrine itself. Arising out of the Court's original explanation in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 120 a number of scholars have stressed the value of protecting the free flow of information as the animating principle undergirding the commercial speech doctrine. Some attribute greater public value to this information flow, 121 while others appear to consider the information as a market necessity.
122 From the idea of information flow also must arise the recognition of the speech in question having value, not just for the speaker, but importantly for the listeners. 121. See, e.g., Post, supra note 28, at 4 (arguing that commercial speech "conveys information necessary for public decision making, but that does not itself form part of public discourse").
122. See, e.g., Pomeranz, supra note 105, at 402 ("[E]ssential aspects of the commercial speech doctrine serve society's 'strong interest in the free flow of commercial information' in order to protect and maintain transparent and efficient markets based on 'intelligent and well informed' consumers." (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-65)).
123. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763 ("As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."); Piety, supra note 100, at 1 (arguing that the commercial speech "doctrine was not created to protect commercial speakers. It was created to carve out a limited area of First Amendment protection for truthful commercial speech in order to protect consumers' right to receive accurate product information and to thereby promote the public interest in a properly functioning market"); Post, supra note 28, at 14 ("The Court's development of commercial speech doctrine closely tracks Meiklejohn's analysis. The Court has been quite explicit that commercial speech should be constitutionally protected so as to safeguard the circulation of information. It has therefore focused its analysis on the need to receive information, rather than on the rights of speakers."); Pomeranz, supra note 105, at 404-05 ('"[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the Without a clear definition of commercial speech, there is also the danger of fully protected and not fully protected forms of speech collapsing into one another. Frederick Schauer has flagged the danger of "doctrinal dilution" should heightened First Amendment protection be accorded to commercial speech.
124 '"[D]octrinal dilution' refers to the possibility that some existing [F] 
126
William Van Alstyne raises a similar concern, labeled as the choice between leveling up and leveling down. 127 Recognizing that there have been signals within the doctrine that commercial speech should be subject to the same protections as core political speech, he notes: There can be no doubt, for example, that some commercial speech is likely to be harmful. Misbranded products are a good example. But restrictions on speech because of its harmfulness, in a system in which speech is protected despite its harmfulness, are normally permissible if and only if the requirements of Brandenburg v. Ohio, as further clarified in Hess v. Indiana, are satisfied. And it is clear that whatever the likelihood of harm would be in a misbranded product case, the possibility that the imminence and incitement standards of current law would be satisfied is virtually nonexistent. Thus, were existing first amendment rules to be applied to commercial speech, the choice, in the future development of the law, would be between holding almost all of product misrepresentation law unconstitutional, or of modifying the Brandenburg test so that it would then permit the regulation of misbranded products. It is by no means inconceivable that the Supreme Court, faced with these as the only alternatives, would choose the latter course. The consequence of that, it can be seen, is that Brandenburg, having been weakened to accommodate the inevitable regulability of misbranded products, remains weakened as a protector of the kinds of political argument it was originally designed to protect.
!d. (citations omitted).
127. William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1635 (1996) ; see also Pomeranz, supra note 105, at 432-34 (cautioning against "an erosion of the commercial speech doctrine without any serious consideration of its consequences").
The choice must be made, that is, either to "level up" commercial speech to the high plateau of core political speech or to "level down" political speech to the low plateau of commercial speech, or perhaps to have them meet somewhere in between. If the one sort of speech is to be acknowledged as "as much within" or "as well within" the First Amendment as the other, these are the evident choices to be made-to unifY the standards, and so have them generally treated indistinguishably.l28
61
It is apparent from both the case law and the scholarship that the definition of commercial speech is a topic of much disagreement. Within this dialogue are efforts both to describe what commercial speech is, by reference to the way courts have developed the doctrine, as well as to posit what commercial speech should be--claims differently rooted in expanding or contracting the definition. It is against this backdrop that this Article seeks to carve out a space to reach the speech of "free" service providers.
Questions surrounding what is included in the category of commercial speech-and what is left out, either as core speech or as speech not within the First Amendment's ambit--continue to abound. With the seemingly ever-increasing number of Internet and technology companies, new actors are engaging in new forms of speech, which do not fit within traditional categories of commercial and non-commercial speech, but which society may be concerned with regulating. The commercial speech doctrine, though sometimes considered broader than transactional speech, 129 nonetheless usually hinges on the definition of speech that "does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction."' 130 In the face of new market models, this concept of a commercial transaction needs to be unpacked.
II. RISE OF NEW ECONOMY BUSINESS MODELS
In addition to the already existing definitional struggles in the area of commercial speech, the development of new business models by some of the largest commercial enterprises in the global economy is likely to strain-or at least stretch-the doctrine, which was developed to deal with more traditional direct fmancial fee-for-service or product purchasing transactions. Web Pinterest, 131 have abandoned direct financial transactions, instead selling consumer data to advertisers for profit. Consumers, in turn, have begun to expect that web-based services like social networking and search engines will be provided for free. However, despite the shift away from the traditional financial relationships that underlay the commercial speech test, it appears that all parties-web companies, consumers, and government actors-assume that the content that passes between the company and the consumer can be regulated.
A. From Fee-for-Service to Commodifying the Consumer
In direct contrast with the above-described iterations of the commercial speech test as articulated by courts and scholars, 132 the predominant business model of social media and other Web 2.0 ventures 133 is not a feefor-service model. Rather, websites such as Facebook, Pinterest, Google, Bing, and Twitter raise revenue through indirect means. Instead of charging their users a fee for access to the social media site, these companies sell their users' personal information and user-generated content (UGC) to third parties. By providing a free, attractive service that encourages users to share personal information and content, 134 social networking sites are able to generate value by virtue of their ability to sell behavioral advertisements leveraged against user data, identifying for advertisers the likes and dislikes of 131. Pinterest recently raised $100 million in additional capital at a $1.5 billion valuation for the company. Matthew Yglesias, ?interest Gets $1. While UGC websites have often been celebrated for enabling an explosion of creative content on the Internet-from music to political commentary138-the less-discussed side of the UGC revolution has been the explanation of why websites have been actively facilitating UGC. As users generate and post content through UGC sites, they create an ever-increasing amount of data about themselves and their friends that the sites can "sell against" to advertisers. Although there is some controversy as to the potential profitability of the websites using consumer information to sell behavioral advertising, 143 at least some sources have attempted to place a direct valuation on the personal information and UGC posted by consumers.
144 A 2009 study estimated the price of behavioral advertising at "2.68 times the price of untargeted advertising. '' 145 ill addition to sales of behavioral advertising, Web 2.0 companies raise money merely by virtue of their large user bases. That is, the more users a web service is able to attract, the more advertisers will be willing to pay to have exposure to a larger audience. 146 are two ways that the new online economy capitalizes on providing free services to users: (1) the more traditional route of creating a venue where a large number of eyes can be turned towards advertisements; and (2) the newer route of leveraging against user data to create targeted advertisements and consumer dossiers.
While this fast-rising business model poses interesting questions for corporate valuation and consumer privacy, this Article focuses on the implications that an indirect monetization of consumer content has on the viability of the commercial speech doctrine as currently formulated.
B. User Expectations
Perhaps part of the shift away from a fee-for-service business model and towards a data-driven model that leverages the size of a user base and the users' information has to do with shifting user expectations. The expectations of users of social networking and search engine sites may further undermine the traditional relationship between commercial actor and consumer-and therefore also undermine the current concept of commerce underlying the commercial speech doctrine.
As some scholars have noted, the rise of UGC-driven sites has upset, if not destroyed, the traditional business models of the cultural industry.
147
Likewise, the rise of free services on the Internet-whether those services are search engines, social media, photo sharing, or other services-has created a user expectation that Internet services be free.
148 Few people today would imagine paying for basic search engine access, use of a service like Facebook, 149 or even web-based political and news content. 150 Although some news sites have attempted to maintain profitability by moving to a fee-for-service model, such moves have largely been met with consumer http://www. theatlantic.com/technology/archive/20 12/07 /the-big-digg-lesson-a-socialnetwork-is-worth-precisely-as-much-as-its-community/259770/ ("There is one clear lesson from Digg's sale: the technology that powered a once-massive social network is worth about $500,000. All the rest of the value derives from the people that use it. Though scaling is tough, any developer in the world can build some profiles and let people connect up. It's an act of genius--or an act of God, by which I mean luck-to design a site constitution that makes people want to build their online lives at your URL (or in your app). Social networking companies are not technology companies as much as they are community companies.").
147 resistance and even outrage. 151 So, in some ways, consumers have chosen to "pay" for their web services by allowing their information and participation in the site to be sold against, and by being exposed to behavioral advertisements.152
At the same time, consumers remain wary of the privacy policies of the major online powers. 153 Although the services are free, consumers are often troubled 154 by the frequent stories of data collection, 155 privacy breaches, 156 and changing terms of service. 157 Interestingly, these concerns do not appear to affect the customer volume or market dominance of sites like Fa- 152. Picker, supra note 133, at 6 ("I paid cash for Outlook but I 'pay' for Gmail by being exposed to the advertisements that it places on the far right edge of the screen."); see also Swire, supra note 135, at 1195 ("[A]n emerging argument is that behavioral advertising is essential to pay for 'free' content online-this type of advertising is the last, best hope for the newspaper industry to pay for investigative journalism and the other expenses of an independent news media.").
153. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, MOBILE PRIVACY: A USER'S PERSPECTIVE: SUMMARY FINDINGS 6 (2011), available at http://www.truste.com/why _ TRUSTe _privacy_ services/harris-mobile-survey/TRUSTeMobile-Privacy-Report-Summary.pdf (finding that privacy is the primary concern of many mobile Internet users, with "98% of consumers express[ing] a strong desire for better controls over how their personal information is collected and used via mobile devices and apps," and "85% want[ing] to be able to opt into or out of targeted mobile ads").
154. Andrew B. Serwin, Privacy 3.0-The Principle of Proportionality, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 869, 872 (2009) ("Despite the proliferation of privacy laws in the United States, more and more people feel they have less protection for their personal information.").
155. For example, Target recently acknowledged that its data collection practices enabled its stores to be able to identify pregnant customers and send them targeted advertising early in pregnancy, which made some customers '"queasy. 156. In the latest of a long string of data breaches, both Linkedln and eHarmony notified consumers in the spring of 2012 that breaches were affecting large numbers of consumer passwords. Hayley Tsukayama, Linkedln, eHarmony Deal with Breach Aftermath, WASH. PosT (June 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/linkedineharmony-deal-with-breach-aftermath/20 12/06/07 /gJQA wqs5KV _ story.html.
157. 02/facebooks-new-terms-of-service-we-can-do-anything-wewant-with-your-content-forever.html (describing a unilateral change to the Facebook Terms of Service that "grant Facebook an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully paid, worldwide license" to use UGC, even after a user terminates his or her account).
cebook. 158 Consumers of dominant web services, therefore, are in a position where they may feel locked into using that site 159 but have no bargaining power to ensure that their data is well looked-after. 160 The sole decision point for consumers is at the initial sign-u{T-the companies' websites, advertisements, and terms of service should lay out data use, privacy policies, and other corporate terms. But what happens if those sources provide untrue or confusing information about how consumer data will be used?
Consumers are not in a particularly good position to correct misleading information through litigation or to demand further information that the company may be unwilling to provide. 161 First, consumers are usually fairly unaware of the data use practices of the web services they use because the behavioral targeting is often invisible to the consumer. 162 This is compounded by the fairly fluid nature of data use policies. 163 Further, the policies of websites regarding data use are often very difficult for even savvy consumers to understand. 164 These features of the user-website relationship make it difficult for consumers to determine whether a site's written policies or ad- 160. !d. at 46. Virtually all of these on-line terms of service are '"take-it-or-leave-it'" propositions. !d. If a user is unwilling to agree to the terms of service, she will be unable to access the product. !d. Furthermore, the data input to such services via UGC is generally held permanently by the service provider. See cwalters, supra note 157. Even if a user no longer consents to the terms of service, leaves the website, or the company changes its terms, the user can only withdraw prospectively; all of the submitted data remains in the hands of the service provider. 162. The fact that consumers are relatively unaware of such practices may be what allows them to be so effective:
Profilers certainly benefit from their obscurity when it comes to avoiding liability for inappropriate disclosure. Even if a consumer suspected that the contents of his profile had been inappropriately used or disclosed, it would be difficult for him to discern which profiler was at fault, and, therefore, which company to contact or, perhaps, to sue. Because consumers lack this information, they may be without effective legal recourse when a profiler's use of behavioral targeting harms them. Berger, supra note 135, at 15 (citations omitted).
163 vertisements provide them with accurate information sufficient to allow them to make an informed decision. Additionally, even if users were able to determine that they were misled by site advertisements or policies, it would likely be difficult to prove that they were damaged 165 -a required element of a false advertising or unlawful business practices cause of action in many states. 166 After all, it is difficult to determine the exact damages caused by a false or misleading data use policy to a user who was not paying for site access.
C. Present Regulation by the Federal Government
Despite the indirect financial relationship between Web 2.0 businesses and their users, it appears that both federal regulators and the companies themselves have assumed that false or misleading advertisements or terms of service can be regulated. 167 However, limited regulatory authority and companies' First Amendment rights may constrain the effectiveness of such regulations.
As many commentators have noted, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has a rather limited scope of authority in regulating Internet companies.168 The FTC is enabled by the Federal Trade Commission Act to regu- 167. This Article does not consider the regulation of how such companies may use the data they have collected. The actual ways that such service providers use their users' individual data remains an area of appropriate concern for regulation and study. With our focus on terms of service and advertisements, we are not dismissing the real privacy concerns attached to appropriate data usage; they simply lie outside the scope of this Article. For an excellent consideration of data privacy and the First Amendment, see generally Richards, supra note 12.
168. , 2:00 AM), http:/ /m.mothetjones.corn/media/20 12/06/stanford-grad-student -scooped-ftc-on! ine-privacyregulation (reporting on the FTC's resource and hardware shortcomings, which include the inability of investigators to access most websites from their work computers, and using cell phone tethers and other "workaround[s]" to access sites under investigation). late unfair and deceptive trade practices in or affecting commerce. 169 The FTC considers advertising to be deceptive if there is a material representation, omission, act, or practice that is likely to mislead reasonable consumers.170 The FTC has interpreted the materiality requirement broadly to include any information '"important to a consumer's decision to buy or use the product. "' 171
The FTC has taken this mandate 172 and applied it to regulate the behavior of websites offering free services to users that are false, misleading, or unclear about their data use policies. 173 In addition to publishing selfregulatory principles for online behavioral advertising 174 and issuing recommendations for a privacy framework, 175 in the last two years, the FTC brought enforcement actions against two Web 2.0 titans-Facebook and Google. 176 The orders obtained by the FTC in the Google and Facebook enforcement actions required, among other things, that the companies obtain consumers' affirmative consent before materially changing their data practices or policies. 177 The actions also resulted in both companies agreeing to create companywide privacy programs that would be assessed by outside auditors over the next two decades. 178 The FTC enforcement actions and subsequent settlements strongly imply that both the FTC and the regulated entities believe that the transactions between purveyors of free web services and their users is a commercial one. This is in contrast to purveyors of free services in another context. In at least three federal cases brought by so-called crisis pregnancy centers, the centers have made the argument that because their medical and personal counseling services are offered for free, the government can neither compel disclosures to correct false and misleading information about the services offered by these clinics nor regulate any false or misleading advertisements made by the clinics. 179 At least three federal courts have found these arguments persuasive in the context of compelled disclosures. 180 Under the standard suggested by these cases, companies like Facebook and Google could falsely advertise their services with impunity, and the government would be unable to compel data use or other privacy disclosures.
181
To date, companies like Facebook and Google have not challenged regulation under the FTCA of false or misleading practices vis-a-vis their users. This does not mean, however, that First Amendment defenses are not being raised in consumer suits against such companies. For example, in two class actions brought against Facebook for its "Sponsored Stories" (advertisements using a friend's "like" of a commercial entity's Facebook page) under a California statute prohibiting commercial use of a person's likeness without consent, 182 Facebook raised as a defense that such "likes" were newsworthy and therefore could not be restricted by the California law. Also of note, Google recently commissioned scholar Eugene Volokh to draft a white paper outlining the argument that Google search results are fully protected speech. 184 While neither of these examples raises issues related to the advertising or terms of service of social networking sites or search engines, they suggest that such web companies are not shy about raising First Amendment defenses where they perceive them to exist.
III. REDEFINING THE COMMERCIAL IN AN INFORMATION ECONOMY
A. Audience-Focused Conception of Commercial Speech Looking back across the early cases that gave rise to First Amendment protection for commercial speech, an important difference between commercial and non-commercial speech is noticeable. Where non-commercial speech cases concern themselves primarily with the speaker, 185 commercial speech is expressly concerned with the audience. 186 There are different values that motivate the protection of commercial speech as compared to noncommercial speech:
Whereas communication within "public discourse" is protected both because of its participatory value to a speaker and because of its informational value to an audience, "[a] commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the societal interest in the 'free flow of commercial information. "' 187 This focus on the listener in assessing commercial speech is particularly important because, regardless of the type of speech, a speaker presumes an audience. The perspective of this audience only seems to rise to the level of constitutional concern in the realm of commercial speech. Thus some visions of commercial speech attempt to define the speech itself by looking to the expectations of the audience, rather than of the speaker, or at least on an equal footing with the speaker's expectations. 188 It has not been the case that the simple exchange of money, the "commercial transaction," makes the speech at hand commercial. 189 If the courts are able to conceive of interactions where money is expressly exchanged as non-commercial, it is rather the expectations of the audience that suggest whether speech should be categorized as commercial or non-commercial.
Thus, audience--or dare we say, consumer in this contextexpectations appear to undergird some of the defmitional distinctions made in the commercial speech context. As in Murdock, where the audience expected the relationship to be religious as opposed to commercial--even though accompanied by "an offer to sell (X) good or service at (Y) price" 190 -the court determined that it was in fact religious, fully-protected speech. 191 We could conceive of this determination being reversed where the audience expected the relationship to be a commercial one. Focusing on consumer expectations provides a relatively clear dividing line to classify commercial and non-commercial speech and is likely sufficient for many commercial relationships.
However, in the new digital economy, we must question whether this consumer-focused paradigm will actually reach the speech with which regulators, academics, and even the Web 2.0 companies themselves are interested. 192 It is conceivable that users----consumers--of some of the largest Internet companies do not imagine their relationship to be one encompassing a commercial transaction. With the trajectory of development of social media, search engines, email, and other web services being offered to the consumer at no monetary charge, it is more than likely that consumers expect use of these services not to create a classic economic relationship. 193 And it is all the more likely, with the expectation of receiving these services for free, that users will be wholly unwilling to revert to a paradigm where one is charged money for each use. 194 Furthermore, when facing new products that operate on a different economic playing field than "an offer to sell (X) good or service at (Y) price,"
195 it is quite likely that uniform consumer expectations may not yet even exist. For new relationships that look like classic transactions-that is, those for which people have a point of reference from the rest of their life experiences-the consumer expectations model will likely still reach the speech in which there is a valid interest in regulating. For relationships that do not have this touchstone within previous experience, however, there is cause for concern that an audience-focused approach will not reach the speech in which there is a valid regulatory interest. When entirely new economic models are rolled out, there are not yet consumer expectations tied to them, and thus an audience-focused approach may fall short of that speech we would want to be included within that realm of commercial speech.
B. Commercial Speech, Consumer Expectations, and Shifting Norms
A commercial speech test that focuses on the audience-that is, on the expectations of the speech consumer-might not capture the speech with which this Article is concerned. The advertisements of free services like Facebook, Google, Twitter, Bing, and Pinterest do not propose what a consumer might consider to be a "commercial transaction." Consumers generally do not conceptualize their relationship with free online services as being a commercial one in the "(X) good or service at (Y) price" 196 context. Rather, consumer expectations of these services are that they are free services. 197 As discussed in Part II, the norm has shifted such that individuals expect as a default that their social media, search engines, and other web services will be provided free of charge. 198 In the face of frequent, unsubstantiated reports of Facebook moving to a pay-for-use model, 199 Facebook has worked hard to dispel these rumors, going so far as to put on the initial sign-up page that the service will always be free. 200 Some savvy consumers may realize that their relationship with web services is not born of altruism by those companies, but rather is based on ad sales. Few, however, will realize that rather than a passive ad sales relationship (like that developed in the free television era), the true value of the relationship is not only as a pair of eyes to view an advertisement, but as an aggregate of individual data that can be sold to advertisers to create increas- 200. See FACEBOOK, supra note 5 (stating, "It's free and always will be").
ingly personalized and custom advertisements. 201 Indeed, because many web companies begin offering services before monetizing-and indeed before corning up with a strategy to monetize-it is not really the consumer's fault when she doesn't conceive of the relationship as a commercial one. 202 Though the suggestion that the concerns animating the commercial speech doctrine are focused on the audience rather than the speaker is not necessarily misplaced, the focus on consumer expectations to identify which speech is commercial simply does not capture the nuances of the modem web economy. What the above discussion is meant to highlight is that in the case of advertisements for free web-based services, the consumer is being commodified in a way that he or she might not realize, but that makes the transaction no less commercial.
203
Accepting the audience-focused approach to commercial speech may suggest a dismissal of these concerns either (1) by claiming that the audience members using these Internet-based services understand themselves to be engaged in a commercial transaction, or (2) by asserting that the real concern is not with consumer expectations, but with ensuring the free flow of information in the commercial arena. The first of these assertions, while perhaps true for some of the more savvy consumers who are wholly aware of their data being traded on, is certainly not the universal understanding of 20 I. See supra Section II .A. 202. How Does ?interest Make Money?, PINTEREST HELP CENTER, https://help.pinterest.com/entries/22997783-How-does-Pinterest-make-money-(last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (answering the question "How does Pinterest make money?," Pinterest states, "Right now, we're focused on growing Pinterest and making it more valuable. To fund these efforts, we've taken outside investment from entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. In the past, we've tested a few different approaches to making money such as affiliate links. We might also try adding advertisements, but we haven't done this yet"); Biz Stone, Hello World, TwiTTER BLOG (Apr. 13, 2010, 12:01 AM), http:/lblog.twitter.com/2010/04/helloworld.html; see also Brian X. Chen & Jenna Wortham, A Game Explodes and Changes Life Overnight at a Struggling Start-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, at B3 (noting a game company was "not bringing in much revenue" on games, but with the advent of one popular game and the accompanying spike in number of users, it sold itself to a larger company for millions); Rob Walker, Peace, Love and Tumblr, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 15, 2012, at 22, available at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/20 12/07 /15/magazine/can-tumblrs-david-karpembrace-ads-without-selling-out.htrnl (describing Tumblr founder's struggle to create profitable ad revenue through "sponsorship" and brand creation, rather than behavioral advertising).
203. In response to this commodification, some have suggested an "anti-free-software movement" that would prefer direct money-for-services transactions over the rising free services-for-data model. E.g., Alexis C. why-you-should-want-to-pay-forsoftware-instagram-edition/266367/ ("Truly, the only way to get around the privacy problems inherent in advertising-supported social networks is to pay for services that we value. It's amazing what power we gain in becoming paying customers instead of the product being sold.").
those using these so-called "free services.m 04 Furthermore, even if this consumer understanding was true, it still would not answer the argument of those who wish to advance a clearly outlined defmition of commercial speech. 205 The second of these two assertions certainly does track with the case law considering the matter. However, it can be seen as begging the question: Without a clear operative definition of commercial speech, how do we determine whether a particular area makes up part of the commercial arena in which the flow of speech can be regulated? This Article does not seek to diverge too sharply from the Bolger test for commercial speech, 207 but rather to propose a change in our conception of what it means to propose a "commercial transaction" in the modem information economy. 208 The old formulation of commercial speech as speech that proposes the sale of a good or service for a particular price 209 needs to give way to realize the commercial value of consumer data. What we propose is that the definition of "commercial transaction" should include transactions where a company leverages consumer participation in its service as a saleable good.
There are two facets to this proposition. First, consumer participation in a "free" service is valuable in and of itself because larger audience numbers allow websites (and in the earlier formulation, network television sta-tions) to sell advertisements for a premium. 210 But more importantly, the personal data provided by consumers through their online participation, whether by creation ofUGC on a social networking site or by the content of their searches on an Internet search engine, is of great value to these service providers.
There seems to be little disagreement that consumer data is a valuable commodity. Numerous articles have described the great and ever-increasing value of the consumer data that companies like Google, Facebook, and Microsoft are able to extract from user interactions with their web-based services. 211 In some ways, commentators have noted, most web titans are running a data mining operation, offering free services as loss leaders to drive up traffic.
212 Data provided by consumers is used not only by web companies to sell more targeted advertisements, which command a price premium, 213 but can also be aggregated and sold to other companies.
214
The leveraging of consumer data to sell advertisements or aggregate data is surely as much of a commercial enterprise as providing "(X) good or service at (Y) price." 215 It is clear that when one of these online service providers collects user information to sell to a data aggregator or displays targeted ads for an advertiser, it is engaged in a commercial transaction. This fact underscores the value of a user base and user data. Thus, it must be the case that when users take advantage of these "free" online services they 210. Consider, for example, the premium advertisements on broadcast media during high traffic viewing such as the Super Bowl or the Academy Awards. This ad time is precisely more valuable because of the increased number of viewers, just as a large number of users bestows value on these Internet based services. It would seem apparent that even though NBC did not charge viewers for access to the channel, they could still not produce misleading advertisements about themselves.
211. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 212. Vasant Dhar, Get Paid for Your Data on Facebook, WIRED (June 11, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://www. wired.com/business/20 12/06/opinion-get-paid-for-your-fb-data/ ("As its user base grows, Facebook's data becomes its primary asset. ... Large troves of data are valuable because they make it easy to build predictive models which in tum translate into money."). have exchanged something of clear value, and a commercial transaction has taken place. Advertisements designed to persuade consumers to use such services-and thus provide the company with valuable data-should also be squarely within the definition of commercial speech.
Indeed, if the exchange of consumer data (whether UGC, search data, or GPS location) for access to a free service were not considered an exchange of valued goods, many of the terms of service provided by the service providers would not be enforceable. Courts across the country have upheld so-called "clickwrap" agreements that users must accept to proceed and use the site's services 216 without controversy, even in the case of sites offering free web services.
217
Similar to clickwrap agreements are "browsewrap" agreements.
218 Although there is some controversy over whether the distinction between clickwrap and browsewrap agreements is a useful or meaningful one, 219 courts have increasingly been willing to uphold even browsewrap agreements as enforceable contracts. 220 Whether the terms of service agreements used by companies like Facebook are considered clickwrap, browsewrap, or '"modified clickwrap, "' 221 courts have upheld Facebook's terms of service as an enforceable contract. 222 Underlying these decisions is the understanding that, even in the case of sites offering free services, there is sufficient consideration being offered by the consumer in exchange for those services. 223 This makes sense, given the real-world value of the data the consumer creates by using, interacting with, and sometimes generating content for the free site. Given the courts' implicit acceptance of the value of consumer data to websites offering free services, it seems odd to have a definition of "consumer transaction" that excludes such exchanges. The expansion of "commercial transaction" to include exchanges of free services for personal data that will be leveraged against for later ad sales or aggregation is therefore consistent with what courts enforcing web terms of service agreements already acknowledge to be an exchange of commercially valuable goods.
While changing the conception of the commercial speech doctrine to reach these transactions of the new information economy does not significantly diverge from the current defmition laid out in Bolger and elsewhere, it is a critical expansion necessary to reach some of the largest commercial actors in the digital economy. A test that expands the definition of commercial speech to reach speech that is not proposing a direct fee-for-services transaction actually follows the path of Bolger quite well. Notably, it was in Bolger that the Court determined speech that did more than propose a direct economic transaction could still be regulated as commercial speech. 224 Though not making any given factor determinative, there, the Court looked to deeper motivation behind the speech. 225 Our test makes a similar move. Access to these "free" services is not provided by the benevolence of the Internet companies; rather access is granted in exchange for commercially valuable assets-a user base and user data. The motivation behind the speech of these digital companies is, in fact, classically economic. They are receiving a valuable good in exchange for their "free" services.
Furthermore, expanding the definition of commercial transactions, and thus commercial speech, to include these data-for-services leveraging relationships is also thoroughly consistent with the values underlying the commercial speech doctrine. Perhaps even more so than in the context of classic fee-for-good or fee-for-service advertising, users in the "free" digital context have a deep interest in an open flow of information, one of the key motivations behind the grant of protection for commercial speech. 226 Individuals clearly understand that when they exchange money for a good or service they are engaged in an economic transaction with the speaker. Further, they are more likely, being wholly aware of the financial motivation of the speaker, to be wary when considering apparent advertising. In the new economic models discussed above, this commercial relationship is often less apparent to the users, and thus they may be less likely to turn a critical eye to the speech in question. 227 Furthermore, in a transaction where the consumers may be less aware of what they are giving up, it is all the more critical that the flow of information be robust. Our test calls not just for a consistent application of the commercial speech doctrine, but for taking extremely seriously the values underlying the doctrine. The free flow of information is critical to consumer choice, 228 and the commercial speech doctrine should be applied in a way that takes consumer access to information very seriously.
Some may worry that this expansion of the definition of commercial speech could lead to a slippery slope, reaching forms of speech that should be entitled to full First Amendment protection. This argument insists that there be a fee-for-goods or a fee-for-services transaction proffered in order for speech to be considered commercial. This concern is unfounded for two ascendant economic model. Every legal doctrine arises in a particularized historical period, but as the Court has consistently noted, cognizance of this historical reality does not cabin the application of the doctrine solely to the problems of that time period. 235 Keeping this in mind, it seems obvious that the defmition of commercial speech should be expanded to reach the transactional relationship that has become so common across the past decades that huge portions of our population undertake it multiple times a day.
'
It is of perhaps greater importance in a time of increased protection of commercial speakers to have a commercial speech test that maps more completely to the economic transactions of the day. Where corporate actors otherwise have a full panoply of speech rights, 237 it is critical that consumers be able to access the full scope of necessary information when interacting with these increasingly powerful actors. Simply because speech rights now enure in much of the speech of corporate actors, it does not follow that all speech should have the same height of First Amendment protection. Such a conclusion conflates the speaker with the particular speech act and loses sight of the values underlying the commercial speech doctrine.
Once again, it is important to recognize the benefits afforded by Facebook, Google, and other free web services. The ability to connect socially across states, countries, and continents; share photographs and ideas with a worldwide audience; and have questions about politics, science, the arts, sports, music, and a panoply of other areas answered instantaneously are of
